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Abstract—Power system cascading failures become more time
variant and complex because of the increasing network in-
terconnection and higher renewable energy penetration. High
computational cost is the main obstacle for a more frequent online
cascading failure search, which is essential to improve system
security. In this work, we show that the complex mechanism
of cascading failures can be well captured by training a graph
convolutional network (GCN) offline. Subsequently, the search of
cascading failures can be significantly accelerated with the aid
of the trained GCN model. We link the power network topology
with the structure of the GCN, yielding a smaller parameter
space to learn the complex mechanism. We further enable the
interpretability of the GCN model by a layer-wise relevance
propagation (LRP) algorithm. The proposed method is tested on
both the IEEE RTS-79 test system and China’s Henan Province
power system. The results show that the GCN guided method
can not only accelerate the search of cascading failures, but also
reveal the reasons for predicting the potential cascading failures.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, security assessment, graph
convolutional network, deep learning, interpretability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In interconnected power systems, some local failures can
yield subsequent failures which may eventually lead to a severe
damage to the system. This sequence of failures is referred
to as the “cascading failure”. Searching the critical cascading
failure paths is of great importance for securing the operation
conditions. Once some critical cascading failure paths are
detected, various preventive strategies can be applied, such
as re-dispatching the generators to decrease the power flow
of high risk branches, strengthening the transmission lines
inspection, increasing the generation reserves, etc [1], [2].
With the increasing interconnection of power networks and
the penetration of stochastic renewable generation, cascading
failure paths become more time variant and complex [3], [4].
Therefore, the cascading failure search calls for a more fre-
quent online calculation to safeguard a reliable operation of the
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power system. However, the high computational cost, from the
“curse of combinatorial dimensionality” of the contingencies,
is the major obstacle towards online cascading failure search.
For a power system with N components, the number of N−k
contingencies is N !/(N − k)!, if the sequence matters [1].
Efforts have been made to the efficient analysis of cascading
failures. One approach is to modify the random sampling
strategies of components’ failures, so that more severe paths
could be detected within less samples. Such techniques in-
clude the importance sampling method [5], [6], the splitting
method [7], [8], the random chemistry method [9], etc. Al-
though these methods can significantly improve the sampling
efficiency compared to random sampling, they still suffer from
duplicated simulations of the same cascading paths. To avoid
duplicated simulations, some methods model the cascading
failures simulation as a Markov chain search problem. Yao et
al. proposed the risk estimation index to quantify the priority
of each search attempt [10]. Liu et al. accelerated the cascading
failure simulation by simplifying multiple related DC optimal
power flow problems into affine calculation problems [11].
Nonetheless, the Markov chain search still suffers from high
computational complexity from the large search space of
network cascading failures. Soltan et al. analytically computed
the disturbance value (or the redistribution of power flow)
caused by a failure to replace the power flow calculation [12],
[13]. Such methods provide an efficient way for contingency
analysis, but they cannot well capture the islanding or re-
dispatch events in the whole cascading failure procedure.
Because of the complex mechanism of cascading failures, it
still remains a challenging problem to effectively search for
the cascading failure paths that result in load shedding.
Recently, some machine learning models are proposed to
capture the complex mechanism of cascading failures. The
models learn the mapping from simulated power system oper-
ational data to the vulnerability of the components, thereby ac-
celerating the online cascading failure search. Several different
machine learning models are investigated recently, such as the
deep neural network (DNN) [14], the convolutional neural net-
work (CNN) [15], [16], the auto encoder [17], the Q-learning
model [18], [19], and the influence graph model [20]. Some of
the aforementioned methods train the machine learning model
to directly predict whether the systems are stable or not under
certain contingencies [14], [15], [17], [20]; while others only
use the machine learning model to guide the search with the
physical models (e.g. the power flow based model) [18], [19].
Two vital problems remain to be addressed to build better
machine learning models. One challenge is that the number of
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2model parameters increases significantly with the size of the
power system, making the training process time-consuming
and prone to over fitting. Another challenge is the lack of
interpretability of machine learning models that hinders the
practical applications in power systems [21]. It is necessary for
the power system operators to check the logic of the models
and to understand the underlying factors that cause cascading
failures.
To address the aforementioned problems, we propose a
graph convolutional network (GCN) [22], [23] based approach
for an efficient online search of cascading failures. The GCN
model takes advantage of the fact that the mechanism of cas-
cading failures is highly related to the topology of the power
system, e.g., the failure of a branch will more likely result in
the load shedding of the nearby buses, or the increase of a bus
load will more likely trigger the protection relays of the nearby
branches, etc. The proposed GCN approach uses graphical
model to learn this mechanism and theoretically requires far
less parameters than other machine learning models (DNN
or CNN) [14], [16]. To increase the interpretability of the
model, we tailor the model inputs into four types of factors:
the topology of the network, the impact of the protection
relays, the branch flow, and the amount of load consumption.
Furthermore, we explain the GCN model by a layer-wise
relevance propagation (LRP) algorithm [24] and quantify the
contribution factors of model predictions. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, the paper is the first to implement the
interpretability of GCN models in power grid analysis. The
proposed algorithms can identify the contributing factors that
cause the cascading failures, such results could help manage
the power system to mitigate the damage. The contributions
of this work are as follows:
1) We propose a GCN based approach to guide the search
of cascading failure for a more efficient detection of load
shedding events, which enables an online deployment of
cascading failure search to better protect the power system.
2) The proposed GCN model links the power network topol-
ogy with the structure of neural networks and can learn the
complex power system cascading failure mechanism within
a smaller model parameter space.
3) We implement the LRP algorithm to enable the inter-
pretability of the GCN model so as to narrow down the
contributing factors to the cascading failures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the power system cascading failure simu-
lation and search strategy used in this work. In Section III,
we propose the GCN model and its interpretation method for
cascading failure search. Thereafter, the case study is presented
in Section IV. Finally, Section V draws the conclusions.
II. POWER SYSTEM CASCADING FAILURE SEARCH
A. The Framework of Cascading Failure Search
The framework of power system cascading failure search is
shown in Fig. 1. The purpose of this work is to figure out more
cascading paths that result in load shedding in a certain number
of online search attempts. Firstly, we generate the power
system cascading failure path offline as training samples. We
then train a GCN model that maps from the current operational
state to the vulnerabilities of each component. We combine the
trained GCN model and selected physical rules as the guidance
in the online cascading failure search, where the components
with high vulnerabilities are searched with priorities. The
interpretable results of why certain components are predicted
with high vulnerabilities are also provided by the method.
Fig. 1. The framework of power system cascading failure search over different
states, S.
B. Power System Cascading Failures Simulation
In this work, we simulate the power system cascading
failures based on the ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) [25], [26]
model, which is widely adopted and developed in [7], [10],
[11], [19], [27]. The OPA model simulates the cascading
failures triggered by branch failures in the power system. Two
types of failures are considered. One type is caused by random
events such as sagging and tree contact. The other type is
triggered by the action of protection relays once the branch
flow exceeds the preset threshold. In this work, we simulate
a limited number of random failures (the first type), while
we simulate all the protection relay actions once they happen.
The OPA model applied in this work can be summarized as
follows.
1) Step 1: Set a positive integer value R, so that we only
consider the cases of no more than R random failures.
Run the DC optimal power flow (DCOPF) given the initial
load profile.
2) Step 2: If the number of random branch failures is less
than the preset value R, disconnect a branch. Else, end the
simulation.
3) Step 3: Run the DC power flow (DCPF). Disconnect the
branch that triggers the protection relays and run Step 3
again. If the network separates into islands, conduct load
shedding for the islands which have a lack of generation.
4) Step 4: Re-dispatch the system with the objective to min-
imize the total load shedding and with the constraints of
the system security rules (e.g. the branch flow constraints).
Run Step 2.
Note that the OPA model is implemented as an indicative test
bed, which is not the main focus of this work. We refer to [25],
[26] for more details of the OPA model.
3C. Branch Vulnerabilities to Guide the Search
When simulating the cascading failures, the major compu-
tational burden comes from the combinatorial explosion in
Step 2, i.e., we have to disconnect every branch that may fail
and simulate every possible case. To ease the computational
burden, we train a model that guide the search in Step 2. That
is, we provide a priority on the search order at Step 2, given
the current operational state. To this end, we organize the data
into input XGCN and output yGCN to train the GCN model.
yGCN = f(XGCN ) (1)
The input is the current operational state and the output is a
boolean vector that quantifies the vulnerability of the branches.
The kth variable of the vector yGCNk is a binary value repre-
senting whether the load shedding occurs after disconnecting
branch k (0-without load shedding, 1-load shedding).
Afterwards, we adopt some physical rules to assist the
GCN model. We calculate the value of line outage distribution
factors (LODF) [28], [29]. For a system with N buses, we
have:
Dkm =
Xkm/xm
1−Xkk/xk
, Xkm =M
T
mXMk, (2)
where Dkm denotes the additional branch flow in branch m
(as a fraction of the initial branch flow in branch k) after the
outage of branch k, xk is the branch reactance of branch k,
X is the N ×N nodal reactance matrix, and Mk is a N × 1
vector for branch k from bus i to bus j:
Mk =
[
0
1
... 1
i
... -1
j
... 0
N
]T
. (3)
After the outage of branch k, the vulnerability of branch k
can be quantified by the total branch flow in branch m as a
fraction of its long term maximum branch flow Lmaxm :
αkm = |Lm +DkmLk|/Lmaxm (4)
When αkm exceeds the protection relay threshold β, the pro-
tection relay will disconnect the branch m. When the system
separates into islands, the denominator of (2) (1 − Xkk/xk)
is 0. In this case, we set αkm to another value to avoid
numerical problem. We set αkm = β because β already reaches
the threshold to trigger the protection relays after the power
flow redistribution, which is large enough to represent the
vulnerability of branch k.
αˆkm =
{
αkm 1−Xkk/xk 6= 0
β 1−Xkk/xk = 0
. (5)
Then, we define the vulnerability vector based on physical
rules as yP , with the kth variable as:
yPk = max
m
αˆkm. (6)
(5)-(6) denotes that the protection relay (of branch m with the
largest αˆkm) will take action or the system will separate once
yPk exceeds β. Larger y
P
k intuitively implies the failure of
branch k maybe more likely to incur load shedding. Hence,
yPk serves as a fast yet not accurate factor to quantify the
branch vulnerabilities. Finally, we guide the online search of
cascading failures by both the vulnerabilities learned by the
GCN yGCN and the vulnerabilities from physical rules yP .
D. The Online Search Algorithm
Algorithm 1 The Online Search Algorithm
1: Step 1*: Run the DCOPF given the initial load profile;
2: Step 2*: Use the GCN and physical rules to guide the
search;
3: while the number of random branch failures is less than
a preset value R, do
4: calculate yGCN with (1);
5: for all yGCNk = 1, do
6: disconnect the branch k and run the Step 3 and Step 4
of the OPA model in Section II-B; run Step 2* to
simulate the next failure;
7: end for
8: calculate yP with (2)-(6);
9: for all yPk from the largest to the smallest, do
10: disconnect the branch k and run the Step 3 and Step 4
of the OPA model in Section II-B; run Step 2* to
simulate the next failure;
11: end for
12: end while
13: Step 3*: Output all the cascading paths that cause load
shedding.
The online search model only differs from the OPA model
in the term of the order to disconnect the branches in Step 2,
so that we can detect the cascading failures that result in load
shedding more efficiently. That is, we calculate the yGCN
and yP before running Step 2. Every time we run Step 2,
we first disconnect the branch that yGCNk = 1, then we
disconnect the branch from the largest yPk to the smallest y
P
k .
The aforementioned process is formulated in Algorithm 1.
III. GRAPH CONVOLUTIONAL NETWORK
A. Learning on Graphs
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. A demonstration of three types of layers. (a) The fully connected
layer in DNN model. (b) The convolutional layer in CNN model. (c) The
graph convolutional layer in GCN model.
We focus on how to build the model that maps from the
current operational state to the vulnerability of the branches,
as formulated in (1). The operational data of the power system
is physically represented and correlated in the form of graphs.
The mechanism of cascading failures is also closely related to
the graphical structure of the system. Therefore we choose
the GCN model over the DNN model [14] and the CNN
model [16] because it is designed to capture such graph
structured mechanisms. The basic layers of the DNN model,
the CNN model, and the GCN model are shown in Fig. 2. The
above layers consist of a group of nodes. The nodes in the next
4layer take the weighted summation of the nodes in the previous
layer. The layers mainly differ in the way that they take the
weighted summation among different range of nodes in the
previous layer. The layers in DNN, CNN, and GCN take the
weighted summation of all the nodes, the neighboring nodes
in Euclidean domain, and the neighboring nodes in graph
domain, respectively. Benefiting from the structure of the
graph convolutional layer, the GCN model can better capture
the dependence and relationships represented by graphs.
B. Design of GCN Structure
Fig. 3. An illustration of the network-graph mapping, where branches in the
power network are transformed to nodes in the graph.
For clarity, we use “bus” and “branch” to represent the
power network, while we use “node” and “edge” to repre-
sent the graph in GCN. The traditional GCN models make
classification or regression on nodes, but we search for the
vulnerable branches in our framework. Hence, we conduct a
network-graph mapping as demonstrated in Fig. 3, where the
data organized in branches is transformed to the data organized
in nodes. The two nodes in the graph domain are connected
when the two branches in the power network domain have
common buses. For a power network with L branches, the
graph domain has L nodes. The input of the GCN model can
be formulated as:
XGCN = [x1 ... xc ... xC ] , (7)
where C is the number of input features, xc is a L×1 vector.
The the GCN model to guide the cascading failure search
is depicted in Fig. 4, which maps from XGCN to yGCN .
It consists of two graph convolutional layers and a fully
connected layer with softmax output. The graph convolutional
layer [23] takes the weighted average of the neighboring nodes
in the graph domain and output a certain number of L × 1
vectors (e.g. F vectors). The f th output vector is given by:
ygraphf =
C∑
c=1
Gcfxc + bf1, (8a)
Gcf =
K∑
k=0
wcfkA
k
, (8b)
where wcfk is the learnable weight parameter, bf is the
learnable constant parameter, 1 is the all-ones L × 1 vector,
Gcf is the L × L graph filter, A = D−1/2AD−1/2 is the
normalization of the graph adjacency matrix A, and D is the
diagonal degree matrix of the graph with Dii =
∑
jAij .
Equation (8a) indicates that the output of the graph convo-
lutional layer is the summation of inputs over graph filters.
Equation (8b) indicates that the graph filterGcf can extract the
relationship within K hops (or K neighborhood) in a graph.
The rectified linear unit (Relu) layer serves as the activation
function that add nonlinearity to the neural network. It will
output the positive part of the inputs:
yRelu = max(0,x). (9)
The output dimension through the graph convolutional layer
and the Relu layer is L×F . In one single node, the output can
be transformed as a F × 1 vector. We add a fully connected
layer:
yfully =Wx+ b, (10)
where W is the learnable weights parameters, and b is the
learnable constant parameter. In (10), yfully is a L× 2 vector
that consists of the variables representing the conditions for
each node k: yfullyk1 for normal condition and y
fully
k2 for load
shedding. The classification result is either normal condition
or load shedding that with larger value of yfullyki .
We then introduce the softmax function to provide the
probability of the final classification result:
ysoftki =
ey
fully
ki
ey
fully
k1 + ey
fully
k2
, i = 1, 2. (11)
The classification error is set as the negative log-likelihood
(NLL):
Lnllk = −w1yGCNk log ysoftk1 −w2(1−yGCNk ) log ysoftk2 , (12)
where Lnllk is the NLL of the kth output, y
GCN
k is the ground
truth output as introduced in (1), and w1 and w2 are the
weights to different classes. As the output has less value-
1 (load shedding) than value-0 (without load shedding), we
assign w1 > w2 to learn from biased sample.
C. The Parameter Space of GCN
We analyze the parameter space required to learn the
cascading failure mechanism, by comparing the basic layers
of the DNN model, the CNN model, and the GCN model
again. The comparison of the parameter space of the fully
connected layer in the DNN model, the convolutional layer
in the CNN model, and the graph convolutional layer in the
GCN model are shown in Table I. We assume the number
of neurons of the fully connected layer is NDNN , the kernel
size of the convolutional layer is KCNN × KCNN , and the
number of hops of the graph convolutional layer is KGCN .
See [14], [16] for modeling details of the DNN and the CNN,
respectively.
TABLE I
THE PARAMETER SPACE OF THREE TYPES OF LAYERS.
Fully connected Convolutional Graph convolutional
Parameter space O(N2DNN ) O(K
2
CNN ) O(KGCN )
In Table I, NDNN is proportional to the number of buses
in a power system. KCNN and KGCN denotes how many
5Fig. 4. The structure of the proposed graph convolutional network model.
neighboring nodes to extract the feature from, which is far
less than the number of NDNN . The neighboring nodes in
convolutional layers may not be the neighboring buses in the
power network, thus NCNN should be larger than NGCN to
extract the feature of neighboring buses. To sum up, regarding
the cascading failure learning problem, the graph convolutional
layer has the smallest feature space that is efficient to train.
D. Interpretability of the Model
To increase the interpretability of the proposed GCN model,
we firstly tailor the input of our model into four parts with
physical interpretations, and then we calculate the contribution
factors of the inputs by an LRP algorithm.
In detail, the input of the model is a L× 4 matrix:
XGCN =
[
xt xp xb xl
]
. (13)
In (13), xt is a boolean vector that represents the effects
of current system topology (or the initial failures) on the
cascading failures, with 0 for operational state and 1 for outage
of a branch; xp is a vector that represents the effects of
protection relays, the value is the ratio of absolute branch flow
to the protection relay threshold branch flow (the kth value is
Lk/βL
max
k ); x
b is the absolute branch flow vector; and xl
represents the larger load value between the two buses that
the branch connected to. So far, we have organized our inputs
into four aspects: topology, protection relay, branch flow, and
the bus load.
To quantify the contribution factors of these four inputs, we
implement the LRP algorithm that was proposed to explain the
CNN model [30]. The LRP decomposes the output value into
a combination of the model inputs. The decomposed values,
a.k.a. the relevance scores, quantify the contribution of the
inputs to the output. The process transforms the relevance
scores of the next layer Rd+1i to the relevance scores of the
previous layer Rdi , such that the sum of each relevance scores
of each layer equals to the output value:
y = · · · =
∑
i∈layerd+1
Rd+1i =
∑
i∈layerd
Rdi = · · · =
∑
i∈layer1
R1i . (14)
We decompose the relevance scores of the next layer by the
weights of the positive inputs z+ij from all the connected
neurons of the previous layer:
Rdi =
∑
j∈i
z+ij∑
i′∈j z
+
i′j
Rd+1j , (15)
where
∑
j∈i sums over the neurons in layer d + 1 that
connected with neuron i,
∑
i′∈j sums over the neurons in layer
d that connected with neuron j, and z+ij = max(xiwij , 0) is
the positive part of the input from neuron i to neuron j. We
decompose the relevance scores by the weight of positive parts
to compute the excitatory effects on the output of each layer.
Recall that the Relu activation function only output the positive
parts of the input, so that only positive input can contribute to
larger output (or have excitatory effects) of the Relu activation
function. We only compute the excitatory effects to focus on
the factors that incurs the load shedding. In this work, we
calculate the relevance scores corresponding to the output that
determines the prediction of load shedding. For example, we
calculate the factors that incurs the load shedding after the
failure of branch k. In this case, according to the proposed
GCN model, we decompose the output corresponding to the
load shedding prediction, which is yfullyk1 . That is, the y in (14)
is yfullyk1 in (10).
IV. CASE STUDIES
A. IEEE RTS-79 Test System
The IEEE RTS-79 test system contains 24 buses and
38 branches with a peak load of 2850 MW and a total
generation capacity of 3405 MW [31]. 8000 scenarios (the
XGCN ∼ yGCN pair described in (1)) are generated as
the training dataset, to consider the cases of different load
profiles and different initial contingencies. To model the load
uncertainty, we multiply a random factor drawn uniformly
over the interval [0.9, 1.1] to the load of every bus. To
simulate a more severe result, the actual load of each scenarios
from [31] is enlarged by a factor of 1.1. In this work, we
consider N-2 contingencies as the random initial failures.
The simulation of cascading failures is carried out based on
MATLAB 2018b, Cplex 12.9 [32], and Matpower 6.0 [33].
6The proposed GCN model is implemented by Pytorch 1.3 [34].
The hyper-parameters of the GCN model are tuned by 20%
of the training data. We set the number of hops K = 3, the
ratio of training weight w1/w2 = 20, and the number of the
output vectors of the first and the second graph convolutional
layer as F1 = 16 and F2 = 4, respectively. The model is
trained with 20 epochs and a batch size of 32, using the Adam
optimizer [35] with the learning rate of 0.005.
Fig. 5. The number of detected cascading failure paths that incurs load
shedding as a function of search attempts: the case of IEEE RTS-79 test
system.
We implement a set of newly generated load profiles to
test different cascading failure online search methods. Each
compared method only differs from the Algorithm 1 in the
orders to disconnect the branches in Step 2*.
1) Rand: The branches are disconnected randomly;
2) PFW: The branches are disconnected from the largest
power flow value to the smallest power flow value. It is
the deterministic form of the power flow weighted method
proposed in [19];
3) LODF: The branches are disconnected by the value of yP
described in (2)-(6), from the largest value to the smallest
value. The LODF-based method and its derivatives are
widely used to search the cascading failures [10], [13]
4) GCN: Algorithm 1 proposed in this work.
We present the number of detected cascading failure paths
that incurs load shedding in Fig. 5. After exhaustive search,
there are 22 cascading failure paths that incur load shedding.
The proposed GCN method can detect all the paths after only
50 search attempts, while method LODF, PFW, and Rand
detect all the paths after 1101, 1485, and 1477 search attempts,
respectively. Hence, the proposed GCN method has clearly
higher search efficiency than all other compared methods.
We then show the interpretability of the model by the
proposed LRP method, which present the relevance scores
of the inputs to a certain output. The relevance scores are
the contribution factors of the inputs to the load shedding
events. We use ‘L’ for branch and ‘B’ for bus. From the
above 22 cascading failure paths, we analyze the case with
initial failures L10→L5. That is, we show the relevance scores
to the 5th output of vector yGCN , under the power system
states where L10 is already disconnected, as is depicted in
Fig. 6. A direct physical explanation of the load shedding
(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. The relevance scores for each inputs of the GCN model that triggers
the load shedding for the initial failures L10→L5. (a) The bar graph. (b) The
topological graph that represents a part of the IEEE RTS-79 system.
is that the disconnection of L10 and L5 will result in the
islanding and load shedding of B6. The relevance scores in
Fig. 6 can well explain the above inference. The load shedding
in this case mainly results from the initial failure of L10
(the topology of L10), the increasing load of B6 (the load
corresponding to L5 and L10), and the increasing branch flow
from B2 to B6 (the branch flow of L5). Note that some factors
are not directly related to the load shedding, but they are
related to the factors that directly cause the load shedding.
For example, the protection of L5 is not directly related to
the load shedding of B6, but the increase of the branch flow
/ protection threshold ratio is closely related with the branch
flow of L5. We cannot simply remove the protection vector
xp from the inputs, because it will serve as an independent
determinant as will be shown in the next case.
Fig. 7. The relevance scores for each inputs of the GCN model that triggers
the load shedding for the initial failures L27→L2. The topology is only a
part of the IEEE RTS-79 system.
7The above interpretation results can be directly inferred
from the topology of the system. To further demonstrate the
interpretability of the LRP algorithm, we analyze a cascading
failures case that is less apparent. The relevance scores to the
2nd output of vector yGCN , under the power system states
that L27 is already disconnected (L27→L2), is depicted in
Fig. 7. The disconnection of L27 and L2 will not trigger any
islanding conditions, but the load in B3 relies only on the
transmission line of L6. The branch flow of L6 will exceed the
maximum value. Subsequently, the re-dispatching process will
decrease the branch flow of L6 and causes the load shedding
of B3. The relevance scores in Fig. 7 can also well explain
this process. The load shedding in this case mainly results
from the initial failure of L27 (the topology of L27), the
increasing load of B3 (the load corresponding to L7), and
the branch flow limits of L6 (the protection of L6). The above
cases show that the major contribution factors of the prediction
results correspond to the physical inference of the cascading
failures. The interpretation method can explore some less
obvious factors (e.g. the protection of L6 in Fig. 7) that incurs
the load shedding. Still, the contribution factors also includes
some indirect factors (e.g. the protection of L5 in Fig. 6),
which suggests that operators should be more careful or should
update the model when the operation pattern changes.
B. The Power System of Henan Province
The power system of Henan province considered in this
work is a 500kV-220kV power system. After external network
equivalence, the power system contains 730 buses and 1571
branches. To consider a more severe circumstance, we enlarge
the actual load profiles of Henan province by a factor of 1.1,
and we reduce all the maximum branch flow thresholds by a
factor of 0.8. Since the load shedding events are more rare
in the Henan province case, we increase the ratio of training
weight to w1/w2 = 800. 50000 scenarios are generated as the
training dataset to model different load profiles and different
initial contingencies. The model is trained with 40 epochs and
a batch size of 256. All other experiment settings, including
the cascading failures data generation and the model training
processes, are the same with the IEEE RTS-79 test system.
We first use the power system of Henan province to test the
prediction accuracy of the proposed GCN model, compared
to the DNN and CNN model mentioned above. We generate
10000 new scenarios as the testing dataset. The DNN, CNN,
and the GCN models are trained and tested under the same
training and testing datasets, respectively. The DNN model has
three fully connected layers with 4L, L, and L output neurons,
respectively. The CNN model has two convolutional layers
with one fully connected layer. The kernel size of the two con-
volutional layers are 3×3×16 and 3×3×4, respectively. All of
the models implement the Relu activation function. Since the
number of samples from different classes is unbalanced, a high
total prediction accuracy may not be conducive to an efficient
search of cascading failures. We therefore implement different
indexes to evaluate the prediction result. We first introduce the
confusion matrix in Table II.
Several indexes are introduced [36]:
1) Total accuracy: (a+ d)/(a+ b+ c+ d);
TABLE II
THE CONFUSION MATRIX.
Predicted results
without load shedding load shedding
Actual results without load shedding a b
load shedding c d
2) Hit rate: d/(b+ d);
3) Cover rate: d/(c+ d);
TABLE III
THE COMPARISON OF DNN, CNN, AND GCN MODELS.
DNN CNN GCN
Total accuracy 0.9416 0.9844 0.9988
Hit rate 0.0080 0.0279 0.3013
Cover rate 0.9460 0.8963 0.9961
The calculated values of the above indexes of DNN, CNN,
and GCN model are listed in Table III. Note that the prediction
of the load shedding events is not the final result, but acts as
a guidance for the search for cascading failures that will be
implemented by physical models, as shown in Algorithm 1.
The total accuracy reflects the prediction results of both the
cases with and without load shedding. In practice, however,
the prediction of load shedding events is more related to the
search efficiency of cascading failures. The hit rate measures
how well the predicted load shedding events hit the actual load
shedding. The cover rate is the ratio of predicted load shedding
events to all the load shedding events. A small hit rate will
result in useless search attempts, while a small cover rate will
miss some cascading failure events so that many additional
search attempts are required to compensate for the missing
events. From Table III, the proposed GCN model has the best
performance not only in the total accuracy, but also in terms
of the hit rate and the cover rate.
Fig. 8. The number of detected cascading failure paths that incurs load
shedding as a function of search attempts: the case of Henan provence power
system.
Next, we present the search efficiency on a set of new load
profiles of the power system of Henan province. The search
performance of method Rand, PFW, LODF, and GCN are
8shown in Fig. 8. An exhaustive search identifies 86 cascading
failure paths that incur load shedding. The proposed GCN
method can detect all the paths after 2160 search attempts,
while methods LODF and PFW detect all the paths after
34822 and 38608 search attempts, respectively. Method Rand
can only find a small proportion of all the paths in the
given search attempts. The LODF and the PFW method
have a high search efficiency at the first few search attempts,
but require a high number of search attempts to detect the
remaining cascading failure paths that incur load shedding.
This is because some of the load shedding events can be easily
detected by the physical rules (e.g. the islanding conditions),
while the rest of the events are complex and cannot be detected
by explicit physical rules. The above results indicate that the
proposed GCN based method has a high efficiency in searching
for the load shedding events caused by cascading failures.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our work provides a GCN based approach to conduct
online search for the power system cascading failures with
high efficiency. The proposed method links the power network
topology with the structure of neural networks and therefore
yeilds a smaller parameter space to predict the load shedding
events caused by cascading failures. We also provide an LRP
algorithm to uncover the reasons for predicting the cascading
failure events. Case studies on the IEEE RTS-79 test system
and on China’s Henan province power system validate the
superiority of the method: 1) the GCN model has a better
prediction accuracy than benchmark neural network models;
2) the GCN based cascading search method has a higher
efficiency in detecting the load shedding events caused by
cascading failures; 3) the prediction results of the GCN model
are interpretable, enabling the user to check the logic of
the model and uncover the factors that cause the cascading
failures. Overall, the proposed method enables an efficient and
interpretable online cascading failure search that can contribute
to a reliable operation of power systems.
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